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Parolee's Reduced Expectation of Privacy May
Justify Suspicionless Search: Samson v. California
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCH AND
SEIZURE - PAROLEE RIGHTS - The United States Supreme Court
found that a condition of release can diminish or eliminate a re-
leased prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy such that a
suspicionless search by law enforcement officers would not offend
the Fourth Amendment.
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006).
Petitioner, Donald Samson, was on parole from prison in Cali-
fornia when he was arrested for and charged with possession of
methamphetamine.1 Prior to his arrest, Samson had been walk-
ing down a residential street where he was observed by Alex Roh-
leder, an officer of the San Bruno Police Department. 2 Officer
Rohleder was aware that Samson was a parolee and believed that
a warrant had been issued for his arrest.3 Samson was stopped by
Office Rohleder and asked whether he had an outstanding parole
warrant. 4 Samson answered that he did not.8  Officer Rohleder
confirmed, by radio dispatch, that Samson was on parole and did
not have an outstanding warrant. 6 However, pursuant to section
3067(a) of the California Penal Code, 7 Officer Rohleder decided to
search Samson.8 During the search, Officer Rohleder found a
cigarette box, inside of which was a plastic baggie containing
methamphetamine. 9 Samson was immediately arrested. 10
1. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006).





7. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2196. Section 3067(a) of the California Penal Code provides:
Any inmate who is eligible for release on parole pursuant to this chapter shall
agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other
peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant
and with or without cause.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2003).




The State of California charged Samson with possession of
methamphetamine. 11 Samson moved to suppress the metham-
phetamine evidence, asserting that section 3067(a) unconstitu-
tionally allowed the arresting officer to search his person without
suspicion of criminal activity based solely on his status as a pa-
rolee.12 The trial court denied Samson's motion, finding that sec-
tion 3067(a) authorized the search and that the search was not
"arbitrary or capricious."'13 Samson was tried and convicted of the
charge of possession.14 He was sentenced to seven years impris-
onment. 15
Samson petitioned the California Court of Appeal and again ar-
gued that section 3067(a) violated his right to be free of unreason-
able searches under the Fourth Amendment. 16 Applying the prin-
ciple announced in People v. Reyes, 17 the court of appeal held that
suspicionless searches of parolees were lawful under California
law. 18 Specifically, the court of appeal held that suspicionless
searches of parolees were deemed reasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment provided they were not arbitrary, capri-
cious or harassing. 19 The court of appeal concluded that the
search in this case was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.
20
Accordingly, Samson's appeal was denied. 21 The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari to address whether a con-
dition of release can diminish or eliminate a released prisoner's
reasonable expectation of privacy such that a suspicionless search
by law enforcement would not offend the Fourth Amendment. 22
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. People v. Samson, No. A102394, 2004 W'L 2307111 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2004).
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
17. 968 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1998).
18. Samson, 2004 WL 2307111, at *2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *3.
21. Id.
22. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006).
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Justice Thomas delivered the majority opinion for the Supreme
Court.23 He stated that, in order to "determine whether a search
[was] reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,"
the Court must "examine the totality of the circumstances." 24 In
this context, reasonableness would be determined by weighing two
interests: (1) "the degree to which [a search] intrudes upon an in-
dividual's privacy" and (2) "the degree to which [a search] is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
25
Justice Thomas relied on a previous case, United States v.
Knights, 26 wherein the Supreme Court followed this approach
when it examined the validity of a California law requiring
Knights, as a probationer, to "submit his . . . person, property,
place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search anytime,
with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable
cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." 27 In
evaluating the first prong of the reasonableness test, the Supreme
Court found Knights's probationary status "salient. ' 28 Specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court held that "probation is one point... on a
continuum of possible punishments" and that "by virtue of their
status alone, probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled."29 Rather, "prisoners have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy."3
0
In Samson, the Court explained that "parolees are on the [same]
continuum of state-imposed punishments." 3 1 Unlike probationers,
however, "parolees have fewer expectations of privacy.., because
parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to impris-
onment."32 This, the Court held, was especially true under Cali-
fornia's system of parole. 33 The Supreme Court noticed that Cali-
fornia inmates may serve parole in either physical custody, or may
elect to complete their sentence out of physical custody and subject
to certain conditions. 34 Regardless of physical custody, the State
23. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2195 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Alito, JJ.,
joined; Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined).
24. Id. at 2197 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)).
25. Id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119).
26. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
27. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 114).
28. Id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118).
29. Id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119).
30. Id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20).
31. Id. at 2198.
32. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2198.
33. Id. at 2199.
34. Id. Section 3060.5 of the California Penal Code provides:
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of California remains in legal custody of the inmate for the dura-
tion of his sentence. 35 Accordingly, the inmate is required to com-
ply with all the terms and conditions of parole which may include,
but are not limited to, mandatory drug testing, mandatory meet-
ings with parole officers, and restrictions on association with fel-
ons or gang members. 36 The Court concluded that these condi-
tions demonstrate that parolees have "severely diminished expec-
tations of privacy by virtue of their status alone."
37
The Court reinforced its conclusion by noting that parolees must
sign an order submitting to suspicionless searches as a condition
of parole. 38 Recalling Knights, the Court explained, "we found
that acceptance of a clear and unambiguous search condition sig-
nificantly diminished Knights'[s] reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy."3 9 By analogy, the condition at issue in the present case was
"clearly expressed" to Samson who, the Court implied, was "un-
ambiguously aware of it."40
Having determined that Samson "did not have an expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as legitimate," the Court
turned to the second prong of the reasonableness test, considering
the degree to which a search is needed for the promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests. 41 In Knights, the Supreme Court
held that "probation searches . are necessary to the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests."42 Such interests were two-
fold: (1) integration of probationers back into the community and
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the parole authority shall revoke
the parole of any prisoner who refuses to sign a parole agreement setting forth
the general and any special conditions applicable to the parole, refuses to sign
any form required by the Department of Justice stating that the duty of the
prisoner to register under Section 290 has been explained to the prisoner,
unless the duty to register has not been explained to the prisoner, or refuses to
provide samples of blood or saliva as required by the DNA and Forensic Identi-
fication Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998 (Chapter 6 (commencing with
Section 295) of Title 9 of Part 1), and shall order the prisoner returned to
prison. Confinement pursuant to any single revocation of parole under this
section shall not, absent a new conviction and commitment to prison under
other provisions of law, exceed six months, except as provided in subdivision (c)
of Section 3057.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3060.5 (West 2003).




39. Id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 120).
40. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199.
41. Id. at 2199-200.
42. Id. at 2198 (quoting Knights 534 U.S. at 120-21).
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(2) combating recidivism. 43 Following Knights, the Court held
that the State of California had an "overwhelming interest" in su-
pervising parolees. 44 That interest warranted privacy intrusions
that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 4
5
Furthermore, the Court held that the suspicionless search of pa-
rolees "aids, rather than hinders, the reintegration of parolees into
productive society. ' 46 Specifically, the Court explained that "most
parolees are ill prepared to handle the pressures of reintegration.
. . thus, most parolees require intense supervision."47 Supervision
combats the "incentive-to-conceal" among parolees who, as a class
of persons, are susceptible to recidivism. 48 Accordingly, "searches
... based on individualized suspicion would undermine the State's
ability to effectively supervise parolees[, and] .. .imposing a rea-
sonable suspicion requirement, as urged by petitioner, would give
parolees greater opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal
criminality."
49
The Court acknowledged that empirical evidence demonstrated
the significance of these interests in California, where the recidi-
vism rate was the highest in the nation. 50 Accordingly, the Court
rejected Samson's argument that California's system was "consti-
tutionally defective" in comparison to other systems that "have
been able to further similar interests .. .despite having systems
that permit parolee searches based upon some level of suspi-
cion." 51 The Court concluded that this comparison is "of little rele-
vance to our determination whether California's supervisory sys-
tem is drawn to meet its needs and is reasonable." 52 Moreover,
California's prohibition on arbitrary, capricious or harassing
searches militated against concerns that a suspicionless search
system would undermine state interests. 53 The Supreme Court,
therefore, affirmed the judgment of the California Court of Ap-
peal.54
43. Id. at 2200.
44. Id.
45. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2200.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2201.
49. Id. at 2200-01.
50. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2200.
51. Id. at 2201.
52. Id.




Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, dis-
sented.55 The dissent insisted that parolees have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy beyond that of prisoners and that the Fourth
Amendment does not permit the conclusion that a search sup-
ported by neither individualized suspicion nor "special needs" is
nonetheless "reasonable." 
56
The dissent argued that the Supreme Court has consistently
held that the Fourth Amendment provides limited protection for
parolees. 57 Recognizing that such protection was "not as robust as
that afforded to ordinary citizens," the dissent explained that
Knights cannot be read to have supported a regime of suspi-
cionless searches. 58 To the contrary, suspicionless searches are
"the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to stamp
out."
59
Justice Stevens went on to argue that, if individualized suspi-
cion is no longer required, it must be replaced with measures to
protect against unfettered state action. 60 However, the majority
took issue with the implication that California's parole search law
permits unlimited discretion. 61 The majority noted that Califor-
nia's prohibition on arbitrary, capricious or harassing searches
remains in place despite the Court's interpretation of section
3607(a). 62 The dissent disagreed, arguing that California's prohi-
bition was insufficient and that suspicionless searches should only
be justified on "special needs" grounds.
63
Finally, Justice Stevens pressed that parolees have a legitimate
expectation of privacy distinguishable from that of prisoners. 64 He
argued that the majority's reasoning to the contrary was "entirely
55. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2203.
57. Id. at 2202.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2203.
60. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2204 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2202.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2203. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the Supreme Court held
that "Although we usually require that a search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant
(and thus supported by probable cause, as the Constitution says warrants must be), we
have permitted exceptions when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Griffin, 483 U.S.
at 873. Pursuant to the law as pronounced in Griffin, Justice Stevens argued that a depar-
ture from "special needs" analysis was unprecedented and beyond the scope of the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
64. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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circular." 65  Specifically, Justice Stevens argued that it was not
"enough, in deciding whether someone's expectation of privacy is
'legitimate,' to rely on the existence of the offending condition or
the individual's notice thereof."66  Speaking directly to the fact
that Samson had notice of the suspicionless search condition, Jus-
tice Stevens argued that the "mere fact that a particular State
refuses to acknowledge a parolee's privacy interest cannot mean
that a parolee in that State has no expectation of privacy that so-
ciety is wiling to recognize as legitimate." 67 Accordingly, Justice
Stevens concluded that only a system based on individualized sus-
picion would guard against arbitrary action, caprice and harass-
ment. 6
8
Historically, the applicability of the Fourth Amendment turns
on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a justifi-
able, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that has
been invaded by government action.69 In United States v. Katz, 70
Justice Harlan suggested that an expectation of privacy is "justifi-
able: if the person concerned has 'exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy' and the expectation is one that 'society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable."'' 71
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness
of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the de-
gree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promo-
tion of legitimate governmental interests.72 The right of the peo-
ple "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures" 73 is not absolute but
may be limited under certain circumstances. 74
While imprisoned persons enjoy some constitutional protections,
courts have made clear that imprisonment carries with it the loss
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2206.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2207.
69. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1983).
70. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
71. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74. See generally Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526 ('The proscription against unreasonable




of many significant rights. 75 For example, in Hudson v. Palmer,76
Russell Palmer was an inmate at the Bland Correctional Center in
Bland, Virginia. 77 On September 16, 1981, Hudson, a correctional
officer, conducted a "shakedown" search of Palmer's prison locker
and cell for contraband. 78 During the "shakedown," a ripped pil-
lowcase was discovered in a trash can near Palmer's cell bunk.
79
Thereafter, Palmer was charged pursuant to prison disciplinary
procedures for destroying state property.80  After a hearing,
Palmer was found guilty.81 He was ordered to reimburse the State
for the cost of the material destroyed, and a reprimand was en-
tered on his prison record.82
In sentencing Palmer, the district court held, among other
things, that Hudson's search did not "rise to the level of a consti-
tutional deprivation."8 3 However, that holding was reversed on
appeal.84 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Bell v. Wolfish,8 5 the court of appeals recognized that an indi-
vidual prisoner has a "limited privacy right" in his cell entitling
him to protection against searches conducted solely to harass or to
humiliate.8 6 Moreover, the court noted that the shakedown of a
single prisoner's property is permissible only if done pursuant to
an established program of conducting random searches of single
cells or groups of cells reasonably designed to deter or to discover
the possession of contraband, or upon reasonable belief that the
particular prisoner possessed contraband. 87
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
Palmer had a right of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to
protection against unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment.88 The Court held that, notwithstanding its caution
in approaching claims that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable
in a given context, society "is not prepared to recognize as legiti-
mate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might
75. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
76. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
77. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 519.
78. Id. at 519.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 520.
81. Id.
82. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 520.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 521.
85. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
86. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 521.
87. Id. at 521-22.
88. Id. at 522.
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have in his prison cell;" accordingly, "the Fourth Amendment pro-
scription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the
confines of the prison cell. '8 9 Thus, the recognition of privacy
rights for prisoners in their individual cells did not outweigh the
value of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal insti-
tutions. 90
The Court went on to conclude that prisons are places of invol-
untary confinement and that inmates have "shown a lapse in abil-
ity to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate stan-
dards of society."91 In this environment, administrators are re-
quired to ensure the safety of staff and visitors. 92 They must also
protect and ensure the safety of inmates. 93 Indeed, the admini-
stration of a prison is an extraordinarily difficult undertaking -
one that would be difficult to accomplish if inmates retained a
right of privacy in their cells. 94
Thus, the Court held that determining whether an expectation
of privacy is "legitimate" or "reasonable" necessarily entails a bal-
ancing of interests. 95 In Palmer, the Court weighed two interests:
(1) the interest of society in the security of its penal institutions;
and (2) the interest of the prisoner in privacy within his cell. 96
The Court concluded that a prisoner's expectation of privacy is
necessarily limited and that a right of privacy in traditional
Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the
close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells, which
is required to ensure institutional security and internal order. 97
The Court was satisfied that society would insist that the pris-
oner's expectation of privacy always "yield to what must be con-
sidered the paramount interest in institutional security."98  The
Court believed that it was accepted by society that the loss of free-
89. Id. at 526.
90. Id.
91. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 526.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) ('The fact that prisoners
retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not
subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully
committed. Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the
full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. In sum, there
must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provi-
sions of the Constitution that are of general application.").
95. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 527.
96. Id. at 521.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 528.
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dom of choice and privacy are incidents of confinement. 99 In other
words, the curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical
matter, to accommodate the myriad "institutional needs and objec-
tives" of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security. 100
Not unlike incarceration, the Supreme Court views probation as
one point on a continuum of possible punishments, a point at
which, like prisoners, the probationer does not enjoy certain inci-
dents of liberty more fully enjoyed by ordinary citizens. 10 1 In
United States v. Knights,10 2 the Court held that, "just as other
punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender's free-
doms, a court granting probation may impose reasonable condi-
tions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-
abiding citizens."'
10 3
In Knights, the defendant had been sentenced to summary pro-
bation. 10 4 Among other things, the probation order required Mark
Knights to "submit his . . . person, property, place of residence,
vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a
search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any pro-
bation officer or law enforcement officer."'1 5 Knights had notice of
the provision, as he had signed the same. 
0 6
While on probation, Pacific Gas and Electric (hereinafter
"PG&E") had filed a theft-of-services complaint against Knights
and discontinued his electrical service. 10 7 Knights and a friend
were then placed under suspicion for numerous acts of vandalism
against a PG&E meter.'08 Local detectives noticed that acts of
vandalism coincided with Knights's court appearance dates, and a
sheriffs deputy had stopped Knights near a PG&E gas line while
in possession of pipes and gasoline. 10 9 Detectives conducted sur-
veillance of Knights's apartment and eventually decided to con-
duct a search. 110 They were aware of the search condition in
Knights's probation order and thus believed that a warrant was
99. Id.
100. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974).
101. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
102. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
103. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
104. Id. at 114.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 115.





not necessary. 111 The search revealed a number of incriminating
items. 112 Knights was arrested and indicted for conspiracy to
commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device,
and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. 113
Knights moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search of his apartment. 114 The district court held that the search
was supported by "reasonable suspicion." 115  The district court
nonetheless granted suppression, holding that the search was for
"investigatory" rather than "probationary" purposes.116 The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the search
condition in Knights's probation order is limited as to probation
searches. 117 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide whether a search pursuant to Knights's probation condi-
tion and supported by reasonable suspicion satisfied the Fourth
Amendment and thus could be used for more than probationary
purposes. 11
8
The Court was unanimous in its view, beginning with the
proposition that "probation diminishes a probationer's reasonable
expectation of privacy - so that a probation officer may, consis-
tent with the Fourth Amendment, search a probationer's home
without a warrant, and with only reasonable grounds (not prob-
able cause) to believe that contraband is present."119 Reasonable
grounds imply the "likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring"
such that "an intrusion on the probationer's significantly dimin-
ished privacy interests is reasonable."'120
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a determination of this
kind rests upon the balancing of government and privacy inter-
ests. 121 Specifically, the degree of individualized suspicion re-
quired for a search is determined by the high probability that
criminal conduct is occurring; in such cases, the intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest is reasonable.122 However, while the
Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability
111. Id.
112. Id.





118. Knights, 534 U.S. at 116.
119. Id. at 118.
120. Id. at 122.
121. Id. at 119.
122. Id. at 122.
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embodied in the term "probable cause," the Court concluded that a
lesser degree satisfies the United States Constitution when the
balance of interests makes such a diminished standard reason-
able. 1
23
With respect to the individual's privacy interest, the Court con-
cluded that probation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal
sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after a verdict, a
finding, or a guilty plea.124 Moreover, a court granting probation
may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of
some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens; a search condition
significantly diminishes a probationer's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 125  Finally, regarding the governmental interest, the
Court held that a probationer is assumed to be more likely than
the ordinary citizen to violate the law. 126 Probationers have more
incentive to conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose of
incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because proba-
tioners may be subject to supervision, revocation of probation, and
possible incarceration. 127 Such proceedings are dangerous to pro-
bationers because the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, among other things, do not apply.128 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court struck its balance of interests against
Knights. 1
29
The logical nexus between this conclusion and the holding in
Samson raises various issues and competing concerns. First, the
Supreme Court now endorses the viewpoint that parolees are posi-
tioned (albeit differently) on the same continuum of state-imposed
punishment as prisoners and probationers. 130 Parole is held out
as an established variation on imprisonment of convicted crimi-
nals; 131 the essence of parole is release from prison before the com-
pletion of the sentence on the condition that the prisoner will
abide by certain rules during the remainder of the sentence. 132 On
the Court's continuum of possible punishments, parolees enjoy
123. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122.
124. Id. at 119 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)).
125. Id. at 121.
126. Id. at 120-21.
127. Id.
128. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
129. Id.
130. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
131. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)).
132. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477.
322 Vol. 45
Samson v. California
even less of the average citizen's privacy rights than do probation-
ers. 133
In theory, parolees may be closer to prisoners than are proba-
tioners. However, the Court goes one step further, justifying the
regime of suspicionless searches by equating parolees with prison-
ers. But, as a practical matter, it is difficult to conclude that rea-
sonable persons would view parolees and prisoners as having the
same expectations of privacy. The equation is suspect, and the
Supreme Court's reasoning appears susceptible to the charge that
it has elevated judicial predilection over law.
Secondly, the Supreme Court has never held that a probationer
or parolee may be subject to a full and suspicionless search at the
behest of a law enforcement officer. In fact, such wide latitude has
never been required to achieve important state interests. Rather,
courts have long permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement
when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable cause requirements impractica-
ble. 134 As it stands, the Court's decision may be troubling to some,
since its holding moves beyond the scope of previous decisions.
To many, the Court's decision may be troubling for another,
more important reason. In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggests
that suspicionless searches are "the very evil the Fourth Amend-
ment was intended to stamp out."'1 35 Thus, not only does the
Court depart from the method in which it previously justified war-
rantless searches, it now appears to have sanctioned a type of
search which strikes at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. Even
if one was to concede that the suspicionless search of a parolee
serves the public good, it is a double-edged sword: it comes at the
expense of important and fundamental constitutional guarantees.
This point illustrates the broader debate taking place in Sam-
son. The issue is in essence, philosophical. It is not a question of
whether suspicionless searches of a parolee are reasonable or jus-
tifiable; rather, the issue is whether and to what extent the gov-
ernment may serve a public interest at the expense of constitu-
tional rights.
In light of this Court's conservative disposition, it is not surpris-
ing that parolee rights were narrowly interpreted. Given the pau-
city of historical support for the Court's position, it is more palat-
able to uphold the conviction of a person who was in possession of
133. United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 1990).
134. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
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methamphetamine than to set him free. At least, that is what the•
Court is really trying to say when it focuses on the "reasonable-
ness" of the search.
Whether or not one is persuaded by the Court's rationale, we
will be forced to address the following unanswered question: Is the
public interest better served by a regime of suspicionless searches,
or by a Supreme Court that, in the protection of our fundamental
rights, refuses to allow them?
Christian Antkowiak
